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DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
A MATRIX OF MECHANISMS
Nancy Neslund'
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Article
The purpose of this Article is to respond to the oft-repeated comment that,
in spite of the massive attention various dispute resolution mechanisms have
received in the last decade, theoretical research in the area has been woefully
lacking.' This Article is not intended as a culmination of dispute resolution
knowledge, but as a necessary first step, fabricating a structure of dispute
resolution mechanisms on which later research, theoretical and empirical, can
hang. The output of the Article is a suggested organization of the body of
knowledge known as dispute resolution, or popularly-alternative dispute
resolution or ADR, 2 into its three component parts (dispute resolution mechanisms, dispute variables and process goals) and a preliminary attempt to show how
these components are correlated. This will be done through the use of both text
and charts.

* J.D., Columbia University, 1980; LL.M., New York University, 1990. Ms. Neslund is a partner
in the law firm of Neslund and Neslund, a consulting law practice providing specialty advice to other
attorneys. Her practice focuses on appellate law and general corporate law. Ms. Neslund is also an
adjunct processor at Willamette University teaching business law for undergraduates.
1. Such comments include the following: "The legal scholars have not done very much in the
way of thinking about alternative dispute resolution and how it relates to adjudication and the possible
disadvantages it might pose for the system." Judicial Conference, Recent Developments in Alternative
Forms of Dispute Resolutions, 100 F.R.D. 512, 518 (1983) [hereinafter Recent Developments in ADR];
"In evaluating ADR, we must isolate the different attributes of each of the various alternative
dispute mechanisms and of the courts, both to make our comparisons meaningful and to understand
more fully what each procedure has to offer." Raven, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Expanding
Opportunities,ARB. J. 44, 45 (1988);
"Very little theoretical or empirical progress has been made" in developing guidelines for the
systematic evaluation of cases for their ADR potential. Green, Corporate Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL 203, 277 (1986);
"[W]hat we need to do is continue developing.., a typology of legal disputes and some set of
indicators and contraindicators of the types of alternative processes to which they respond." Judicial
Conference, How Lawyers and Judges Can Use Alternatives to Litigation, 101 F.R.D. 220, 232 (1983)
[hereinafter Alternatives to Litigation].
2. This Article takes as its subject matter the entire panorama of dispute resolution mechanisms,
not just those which under some definition are classified as "alternative" dispute resolution mechanisms.
The belief is that the principles derived from the study of the resolution of disputes should be equally
applicable and explicative of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as courts and legislatures,
as of the "alternatives," such as arbitration and negotiation.
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One of the problems facing anyone wishing to work in the area of dispute
resolution is the difficulty of gleaning general principles or evaluating alternative
processes in an area that comprises literally an infinite number of different
processes. One of the assumptions of this Article is that, although there are
indeed an almost endless number of potential dispute resolution mechanisms, each
of these mechanisms consists of a selection, albeit unique, from only a finite
number of system characteristics. Further, the assumption is that an analysis of
dispute resolution in its broadest sense is possible if we can identify and catalog
these system characteristics. A subset of the existing literature in the dispute
resolution area begins to do just this, but without any pretense of completeness.
Therefore, Part II of this Article attempts to advance these initial attempts by
taking a more comprehensive approach to the problem, although it is to be
expected that experienced practitioners will wish to add additional characteristics
(hopefully only minor in number).
Commonly heard among dispute resolution aficionados is the phrase, "let the
forum fit the fuss." Much of the literature has raised the problem of identifying,
given a particular dispute or class of disputes to be resolved, a principled approach
to choosing a compatible mechanism for the resolution of that dispute. Most of
the "rules" for choosing are in the nature of received wisdom from practitioners
who have reached certain working conclusions from their own successes and
failures. Understandably in a field this new, this received wisdom can be
contradictory.' Whereas Part II looks at the "forum" half of the equation, Part III
looks at the "fuss" and seeks to categorize the types of dispute-related variables
that have been suggested as relevant. Loosely, they fall into two categories:
characteristics of the disputants and characteristics of the underlying issue in
dispute.
The meatiest section of the Article is Part IV. By far the lion's share of the
present literature stops after combining aspects of Parts II and III. The contention
here is that such an approach leaves out the most important consideration, the
consideration that turns analyses and selections in the dispute resolution area into
principled, as opposed to just practical, analyses and selections. The topic of Part

3. For example, a number of authors have opined that ADR mechanisms are inappropriate for use
where disputes are over deeply-held principles or fundamental values or have significant public impact.
Hatch, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalGovernment: A View from Congress, 4 ToUtJo
L REV. 1, 5 (1987); Banks, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Return to Basics, 61 AUSTRALIAN LJ.
569, 570 (1987); Green, supra note 1, at 279; Fine, CPR Working Taxonomy of Alternative Legal
Processes Part I1, ALTERNAiVES TO HIGH COST OF ITIGATION, Nov. 1983, at 5, 12. On the other
hand, "many are suggesting that non-adversarial procedures are appropriate, desirable dispute resolution
procedures that should be invoked with increasing frequency to resolve both the mundane and the most
pressing social issues of our times.' Stulberg, Negotiation Concepts and Advocacy Skills: The ADR
Challenge, 48 ALB. L REv. 719, 739 (1984).
4. Some definitionls of repeated terms may be useful at this point. A "dispute" will be defined as
an issue or collection of issues needing or benefiting from simultaneous solution. "Disputant" will be
used to refer to an actual individual or entity with an interest in a dispute. "Party" will be used to refer
to a disputant and/or a representative of a disputant. A "representative" may or may not refer to an
attorney. "Attorney" will be used where that is the only type of representative referred to.
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IV is process goals, goals such as efficiency, predictability, accessibility and
fairness, to name only a few. To make rational evaluations and choices in the
area of dispute resolution, we must look not only at the practical limitations of
system characteristics and dispute variables, but also at social goals which are
either enhanced or hindered by our choice of procedure.
Part V contains suggestions for the use and further development of the
structure presented in the body of the Article. For example, the framework
created can be used in analyzing such ADR issues as the desirability of a process
in light of a specific controversy, the constitutionality of a particular process or the
design of a new process. Or, alternatively, the framework created can be used to
provide a focus for future theoretical and empirical research, such as testing the
working conclusions drawn in this Article or drawing and testing additional
conclusions drawn by the reader from the material presented. Some specific
suggestions will be made.
B. Research Methodology
The bulk of dispute resolution literature has been written and published in the
last decade. It seems to be expanding geometrically as time passes. The literature
search done for this Article located close to 200 articles, as identified in the
bibliography attached as an appendix to this Article. This is not, however, an
exhaustive listing of the existing literature, even as of the date the literature search
was done. Some articles which might have contributed to this work were not
locally available to the author. Likewise, a number of published books that bear
on this topic are not included in the bibliography. Nevertheless, the articles
reviewed probably represent an acceptable cross-section of that available, based
on a review of the citations contained in the publications which were available.
Existing literature largely falls into one of the following categories: (1)
overviews of one or a few general categories of ADR mechanisms intended to
familiarize the public and lawyers with the basics; (2) more detailed descriptions
of particular ADR programs (often experimental in nature) actually in operation
and accessible to the authors; (3) some empirical studies of sample ADR programs
(focusing on only one type of ADR mechanism and comparing the results to
information available about court adjudication) and (4) a few, more theoretically
slanted articles either looking at one aspect of dispute resolution as it is manifest
in a variety of mechanisms or analytically developing one alternative in greater
depth or suggesting the barest beginnings of an analysis of multiple ADR methods.
Nothing thus far has attempted to create a matrix of mechanisms spanning the
dispute resolution continuum in any substantial degree of detail.
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The raw material for the present Article is the literature identified in the
bibliography.5 From the descriptions and observations of those manipulating the
fabric of present ADR experiments, common threads were collected and assembled
and the richness of multiple observers was attempted to be incorporated. The
more theoretical forays into ADR were used to identify overarching themes and
develop a framework with which to explain and further the theory of dispute
resolution. It must be emphasized that the result is only a beginning step, but
hopefully a significant one, in the development of general dispute resolution
theory. The intent has been to be as comprehensive as possible, in the inclusion
of the variety of available dispute resolution mechanisms (including such
traditional mechanisms as legislatures, courts and administrative agencies) and the
identification of system characteristics, dispute variables and process goals. The
assumption is that theoretically sound conclusions about dispute resolution
generally must be able to take into account and work equally well on any of the
nearly infinite variety of dispute resolution processes and types of disputes which
arise in modern society.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
A. Description of Mechanisms Used to Illustrate
the Dispute Resolution Continuum
As previously stated, there are as a practical matter an infinite variety of
dispute resolution mechanisms which could be created that run along a continuum
that has legislation at one end and negotiation at the other.6 However, most of
these mechanisms can be grouped into a manageable number of general
classifications that span the length of the continuum and adequately serve to
illustrate the material presented in this and later sections of this Article. The
general classifications that will be used here are set forth below, with such
description as seems necessary.
Legislation: In our system of government, legislation is passed only after
two houses have agreed on the exact form of the legislation and either the
executive approves it or it is passed over an executive veto. The decisionmakers
are thus multi-tiered, interbranch, representative and politically accountable to their
constituents.

5. This Article attempts a synthesis of the ideas, experiences and analyses of prior authors who
have written in the broad area of dispute resolution, as well as those of this author. As such, it is
frequently not possible to attribute particular components of the present Article to a specific
predecessor and I will not attempt to do so. I am indeed indebted to all of those whose papers are
referenced in the attached bibliography. Attribution will be made where a direct quote or a specific
development or example is referenced in the text.
6. As described here, the continuum does not include a vast array of possible responses to certain
disputes, such as lumping it, coin-tossing, voting, brute force and war. These mechanisms are, by and
large, not systems based on principle and do not involve the intervention of a human decisionmaker.
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Negotiated Legislation: This varies from traditional legislation in that a
consensus bill is drafted to reflect prior negotiations among interested groups, both
private and public, under the aegis of the legislature. When the draft is introduced
in the legislature, it carries with it an endorsement from the groups participating
in the negotiation. It has been used in both Massachusetts and Wisconsin, where
the experience of the latter has been that, once introduced, such a consensus bill
goes through the remainder of the legislative process without amendment.7
Administrative Rulemaking: The particular type of rulemaking used as
illustrative here is notice-and-comment rulemaking in the form provided in the
federal and most state administrative procedures acts (APAs). Following public
notice of a proposed rule, the agency receives comments from interested persons,
often only in written form, reviews those comments and promulgates a final rule.
Negotiated Rulemaking: In the variation used in this Article, the agency
promulgating the rule assembles representatives from various interested groups to
negotiate the proposed rule before it is put out for comment. The agency is
represented during the negotiations, not as an interested party actively negotiating,
but as a facilitator and to give feedback to the negotiators on the likely reception
all or part of the negotiated proposal may receive at the agency level. The
negotiated proposed rule is published as the proposed rule and the process
continues as with other notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Court Adjudication: The model used here is the paradigmatic civil case
which goes all the way through a trial before either a judge or a jury, with all of
the attendant procedural and evidentiary rules in place and resulting in a final
judgment, with the possibility of appeal.
Summary Jury Trial: This is a settlement device under the auspices of a
court. Particularly where a lengthy jury trial is expected, the judge may first
empanel a mock-jury, chosen from the regular veniremen, to hear the substance
of the case presented by the opposing attorneys. No witnesses are presented,
rather the attorneys summarize the evidence which would be presented at a full
trial and then argue their case before the jury. After deliberation, the jury reports
a non-binding consensus verdict which is intended to permit the parties to discover
how an actual jury might decide their case, but more quickly and more cheaply
than with a full-blown jury trial. The assumption is 1that the greatest barrier to
settlement has been uncertainty as to how the case would be treated by a jury.
The actual disputants, not just their attorneys, are required to attend. Following
the jury verdict, the disputants and their attorneys are permitted to discuss the case
with the jurors, after which settlement negotiations are reopened between the
parties.
Court-Annexed Arbitration: This procedure goes under a variety of names
in ADR literature, including mandatory arbitration and mandatory mediation. It
is another settlement device under the auspices of a court. In an established class
of cases, for example where only money damages are sought and the requested

7. Fine, supra note 3, at 5, 11-12; Dunlop, The NegotiationsAlternative in Dispute Resolution,
29 VILL L. REv. 1421, 1424-25 (1983-84).
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damages fall within some predetermined ceiling, civil cases are assigned to
arbitration before a court-appointed arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The case is
presented to the arbitrator by opposing counsel in a restricted time frame. There
is no live testimony. The decision rendered by the arbitrators the day of the
hearing is non-binding, but it becomes the judgment of the court with no right of
appeal if it is accepted by the parties within a specified time period, such as 20
days. If either party rejects the arbitrator's decision, a trial de novo will be had,
but sanctions will be taken against the rejecting party if they do not do materially
better at trial. The sanction is often the payment of the cost of arbitration (a fairly
minimal amount, such as $200-300). The process is intended to allow the parties
to have a hearing on the merits at a lower cost in time and money.
Private Judging: Often referred to as rent-a-judge, the parties may request
the court to appoint a mutually acceptable private judge to hear the dispute on an
expedited basis and at a time convenient to the parties, avoiding the court docket
backlog. The parties pay for the judge and receive a full trial, complete with all
procedural and evidentiary protections, unless the parties choose to relax them.
The decision, which is rendered within a month of the hearing, is binding on the
parties and becomes the judgment of the court, with all rights to review in place.
Unless the decision is appealed, requiring the parties to agree upon a record for
appeal, the proceedings are confidential except for the final decision, which
contains at least brief findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Administrative Adjudication: "Administrative procedure was the original
alternative dispute resolution technique. However, the administrative procedures
[have become] increasingly institutionalized and.., rigid and cumbersome...
.8 The standard here is again agency action based on an APA. It is characterized by a hearing before a civil service hearing officer involving somewhat less
rigorous rules of procedure and evidence, with the initial review by the agency
head before court review can be sought. Court review is restricted under an
"arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law"
standard.9 The decision is of course binding unless appealed and reversed.
Arbitration: "[A]rbitration is a process in which a dispute is submitted to a
third party or neutral (or sometimes a panel of three arbitrators) to hear arguments,
review evidence and renler a decision"' ° based on principle. The rule of
decision need not necessarily be the rule of law, but is what is set by the parties.
The arbitrator is selected by the parties and may be a specialist in the subject area
of the dispute. Although the decision to submit a dispute to arbitration is
voluntary, the decision once rendered (usually within a month of the hearing) is
binding. Appellate review of the decision is only on very limited grounds, such

8. Perritt, Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of Negotiated
Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 863, 865 (1987).

9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (1983).
10. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation--Explaining the Differences, 69 JuDICATURE 263, 264
(1986).
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as arbitrator partiality, misconduct or failure to heed the limits on the arbitrator's
power.
Med-Arb: Med-arb is the serial use of first mediation and then arbitration.
The same third party acts first as a mediator and, if mediation does not result in
a complete resolution of the dispute, then as an arbitrator as to any remaining
issues. The advantage of this process is giving the parties an opportunity to settle
their own dispute, while insuring that the process will in fact lead to a complete
resolution without having the additional cost, in time and money, of educating a
second neutral.
Mediation: "Mediation is a process in which an impartial intervenor assists
the disputants to reach a voluntary settlement of their differences through an
agreement that [frequently] defines their future behavior.""' Whatever procedural
or evidentiary protections exist are only those to which the parties have agreed.
Although legal arguments may be made, the process is generally one of
persuasion, not proof; the focus of the argument is on the disputants' interests, not
their rights; and the result is usually a compromise outcome. Both the choice of
mediation and the outcome are voluntary actions of the parties. The resolution is
not reviewable as such, but may be enforceable under contract law.
Mini-Trials: A mini-trial is not really a trial, but rather is a structured
settlement procedure. The disputants' attorneys make summary presentations of
their legal proofs and arguments before a party-selected third-party neutral and
principals of the disputants who have the power to settle the dispute on behalf of
the disputants. Procedural and evidentiary rules are set by the parties. Following
the presentations, the disputants' principals adjourn for settlement talks. If they
reach an impasse, they may use the neutral in a role as facilitator or advisor. The
outcome is a consensual and, usually, compromise agreement. Again, it is not
appealable, but rather is enforceable to the extent it comes under contract law.
Neutral Factfinding: Neutral factfinding is generally used to resolve only a
subset of complex technical, economic or scientific issues contained in a greater
dispute. The neutral is a specialist in the appropriate area and is mutually selected
by the parties. Rather than making a decision based on information provided by
the parties, the neutral has investigatory powers to discover the information
necessary to the decision. The outcome is not binding on the parties, but may be
admissible as evidence if the dispute later goes to trial.
Negotiation: Negotiation has been described as the art of persuasion. It is
a process by which disputants attempt to resolve their differences through
compromise and without the aid of a neutral third party. It is a completely
voluntary process with the desired end being consensus. It is indeed the method
that resolves the lion's share of disputes in our society. It is both informal and
largely unstructured.

11. Id. at 266.
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B. Identification of Basic System Characteristics: Table 112
Each of the selected dispute resolution mechanisms is an aggregate of
component parts, which can be categorized and then compared and contrasted to
their counterparts in the other listed dispute resolution mechanisms. Determining
which attributes to include for such comparative purposes is ultimately an
individual judgment call. However, an understanding of how the choices were
made in this instance will allow the user to evaluate how comprehensive the
assemblage is and how reliable hypotheses and conclusions drawn from the
material might be. Two primary approaches were used to determine characteristics
to include. The first was a sifting of the available literature (see the appendix) for
qualities previous writers have found significant. The second was analyzing
process goals (see Part IV) for system characteristics which would either support
goals..The result of this dual process is the information
or hinder achieving those
3
contained in Table 1.1
The system characteristics in Table 1 are loosely ordered in related groups:
the first three are preconditions for using a particular process; the next two identify
restrictions on information used for decisional purposes; the following three focus
on the method of presentation; the five characteristics next in order present
information on third parties and the system decisionmaker; identification of the
degree of government involvement and the source of the decisional law of the case
come next; and, finally, the immediate process output and post-process aspects are
presented.
The information is presented in table format because that is the most efficient
method to provide an immediate and visual comparison of the characteristics of
the fifteen chosen dispute resolution mechanisms. However, the chart is
necessarily in summary form and, thus, some further explanation is required.
With regard to system preconditions, as can readily be seen, courts and courtaffiliated processes are substantially restricted in the disputes that they can hear.
This has particular importance for two different types of disputes (discussed more
fully in Part III): polycentric disputes (disputes with complex interrelationships
due to the number of disputants, positions and issues involved) and non-legal
disputes not recognized by the legal system (e.g., grade disputes between teachers
and students). The notice characteristic is not limited to required notice, but is

12. All four tables are printed on facing pages, in the same type size and with identical column
spacings. The intent is to facilitate reproduction of the tables and vertical assembly. Readers wishing
pre-assembled vertical charts containing all four tables may write to the author at P.O. Box 884, Salem,
OR 97308.
13. Two technical notes to Table 1 are necessary. First, some of the processes are really hybrids,
essentially composites of two separate processes used in series. The characteristics of the two pieces
may be quite different. At times it is necessary to identify the characteristics of both on the chart.
Where this isdone, the complementary characteristics are both listed and separated by a "/," where the
characteristic of the process used first appears first and the characteristic exhibited by the second
process follows the "/." Second, the abbreviation "NA" is used where the characteristic under
consideration is not applicable to a particular dispute resolution process.
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intended to reflect the type of notice that can usually be expected. For some
procedures, the notice identified raises further issues of timeliness and effectiveness.
Both of the next entries, the source of decisional information and discovery,
are intended to reflect what is typical for each of the listed mechanisms. The
primary interest with regard to discovery, however, is what discovery can be
compelled. An entry of "complete" refers to all of the discovery regularly
available in a civil suit. "Limited" indicates that available discovery is less using
these procedures than in court. "Parties may reduce" recognizes that the process
starts with complete discovery, but the parties may choose to reduce it. This
differs from "parties set" in that this means that the parties start with a blank slate,
but may choose to provide certain forms of discovery. The solo designation of
"voluntary" would indicate that discovery cannot be compelled.
A similar relationship holds in the next category, evidentiary and procedural
rules, between the designations "relaxed by parties" and "parties set" as holds
between "parties may reduce" and "parties set" in the category of discovery. The
designated mode of presentation only indicates the predominant mode for any
given dispute resolution mechanism. For example, the predominant job of an
attorney in court is to present proofs (albeit persuasively) of fact and law
supporting the client's position, although in cases where the facts are not at issue
and the legal issue is one of first impression, persuasion will be the primary mode
of presentation. Similarly, the role played by attorneys indicated for each of the
processes is an attorney's preeminent role in that process and not the only role that
might be played.
In the next grouping, one must distinguish between the third party (if any)
and the decisionmaker. They may or may not be the same individual, as shown
by the last entry in this grouping. The characteristics of the third party are
frequently, but not always, a function of the method used to choose them. For
example, many judges are political appointees, but because of their life tenure they
are characterized as political. Further, there may be considerable, and justified,
argument that neither agency heads nor hearing officers qualify as "specialists."
This needs to be kept in mind when drawing conclusions based on those
characteristics. The terminology used in the category "TP role" is as follows: a
decisionmaker is one who makes a binding decision to resolve the entire
controversy, an evaluator is one who makes a decision only on designated issues
of the greater controversy, an advisor is one who makes a non-binding decision
resolving the whole dispute and a facilitator makes no decisions at all.
The next two entries are substantially self-explanatory. One simply identifies
the government's role in each process, if any, and the other the source of
decisional "law" used.
The entries of the last grouping require some further explanation. Quite a lot
of information is contained under the heading "process output." The intent is to
identify for each dispute resolution mechanism: (1) whether the outcome is a
consensus decision or an assessment of rights (or, in the case of neutral factfinding, truth), (2) the nature of the relief afforded these particular disputants (e.g.,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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winner-take-all, creative, prospective, etc.), (3) to what degree the output is
binding on these parties and (4) whether the outcome has any precedential value
for other potential future disputants.
Much literature has discussed or touched on the confidentiality of the record
in the various proceedings. This is an area in which state law is changing and the
phrase, "may be discoverable" is intended to indicate this uncertainty.14 In some
states and with some procedures the content of the record may be protected from
discovery and later use in court in the same spirit as settlement negotiations.
Finally, the availability and nature of review is highlighted. The review
process is to be distinguished from enforcement; and both of these should be
distinguished from a successive use of different dispute resolution mechanisms.
If the parties do not reach a settlement following a summary jury trial, or do not
accept the arbitrator's award in court-annexed arbitration, the process that follows
is a trial de novo in the court that invoked these alternative processes. This trial
de novo is neither an enforcement of the outcome of the prior process nor is it a
review of the prior process. It is simply the use of a new and separate process.
C. Derivative System Characteristics: Table 2
The purpose of this section is to ascertain certain qualitative system attributes
from the information presented in Table 1. This is a comparative assessment,
indicating the relative degree each of the fifteen highlighted dispute resolution
mechanisms reflects certain qualities, such as formality, adversariness, and so on.
Again, one must always keep in mind that the systems being evaluated in this
fashion are specific examples taken from a general category. That is, the
arbitration category and the system characteristics identified as pertaining to it
describe only one possible arbitration alternative. It does not, for example,
describe labor arbitration under our federal labor laws. Thus, the comparative
assessment of arbitration in this section may or may not accurately reflect where
labor arbitration fits into the dispute resolution continuum. The intent here is
twofold: (1) to provide an overview assessment of certain dispute resolution
mechanisms and (2) to provide explanatory material used for these assessments so
that an individual interested in a particular and specific dispute resolution
mechanism (such as labor arbitration) could readily perform a parallel analysis on
that procedure.
The qualities used for this analysis are: the potential for absent but affected
disputants to exist, the degree of formality of the process, the degree of
adversariness, the degree of communication fostered among the disputants, the
degree to which party power imbalances are neutralized by the chosen process,
whether the process is primarily interest-based or rights-based, the degree
voluntary obedience to the process output can be expected, the degree of

14. Petilon, Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 929,
933 (1987); cf. Alternatives to Litigation, supra note 1, at 233.
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reviewability available and the degree of government involvement in each of the
processes. The analysis presented in this section is summarized in Table 2.
To assess the relative degree that each of the dispute resolution processes
reflects the qualities identified above, an analysis was made of the interplay of
relevant characteristics from those contained in Table 1. The discussion which
follows describes the evaluation process used with regard to each of the attributes.
Potential for Absent, but Affected, Disputants: The concern here is that
affected individuals and entities will not be protected because of their absence
from the process and because information from the process is not widely known
or available. For example, the more widespread the notice given at the start of the
process, the less likely an affected individual will not hear of the process and be
able to protect his or her interests. In this light, the rulemaking processes and
legislation look best, although one does have to question how effective public
notice of such events really is at reaching concerned persons. Similarly, the more
confidential the record is, the less likely an absent person will be able to join the
process in progress or use the information in another process of their own. Here,
the most public processes (traditional rulemaking, courts and administrative
adjudication) come off best; negotiated legislation and rulemaking are next in line;
traditional legislation followt' thereafter; and all other processes are less protective.
Another relevant factor is the extent to which a particular forum's jurisdiction
is restricted (so that even if an absent party hears of the dispute, they cannot join
it). Courts and processes coming under court auspices do not appear favorably
under this consideration.
Finally, to the extent that we are concerned with an amorphous "public"
interest in the proceedings, as opposed to the existence of a particular absent
individual, we may be less concerned if the participating third party can somehow
be said to be representative of the public, such that third parties found representative and accountable will rate higher and those that are generalists and neutrals
will be next favored.
Overall, negotiated legislation comes off best, with traditional legislation,
rulemaking and negotiated rulemaking following closely thereafter. Courts come
in the middle of the pack, but after administrative adjudication. One should
remember in this context that, although court records are public records, most
reports indicate that over 90% of civil suits filed are settled out of court before
trial and therefore what is really public are unsubstantiated allegations. Alternatives coming under court auspices are notably at the very bottom of the list.
Degree of System Formality: As a positive characteristic, system formality
may cut both ways. At the same time it increases the substantive consistency of
results, for example, it may be a barrier to lay understanding of what is expected
by the legal system and may decrease the predictability of results for any
particular dispute even by legal experts. That said, even with no reference to the
system characteristics depicted in Table 1, most readers will already be aware that
court procedures are substantially more formal than negotiation and may even
suspect that these two processes represent the ends of the formality continuum.
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Criticism of court litigation on this basis has been widespread, the death of
code pleading notwithstanding, with references to "arcane procedures," "inaccessible language," the "metamorphosis of individual claims into technical legal
issues"'" and, in general, the highly procedural and highly structured process
which litigation represents abounding. On the other hand, this attribute of
litigation has also been praised, in preference to alternative procedures, for
upholding the rule of law, not just "to maximize the ends of private parties, nor
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them."16
Thus, at this point the goal is not to place a value judgment on the quality
called formality, but simply to identify which procedures exhibit it and which do
not. The following factors were considered in the evaluation: jurisdictional
prerequisites, requirement of notice, available discovery, evidentiary and
procedural rules, predominant presentation characteristic, the role played by
attorneys, the identity of the decisionmaker, government involvement, source of
the decisional law of the case and the type of review available. And, indeed, the
processes heading the list of formality are traditional court litigation and
administrative adjudication. 7 At the bottom of the list are mediation and
negotiation.
Degree ofSystemAdversariness: Advocacy, and by extension adversariness,
is enshrined in our system by the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which is -the basis for ethical rules applied to
practicing attorneys in most states. Canon 7 of the Code states, "The duty of a
lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law."'" Like other aspects of our court
system, it has come under a lot of fire. "For some disputes, trials will be the only
means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial contest must in time go the way
of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too
destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people."' 9
Obviously, the employment of attorneys as advocates increases the adversarial
nature of a process. So too does emphasizing proofs over persuasion and giving
a third party the power of a decisionmaker, especially where that decision is
binding on the parties. Where the decision is based on an assessment of rights,
the rule of law forms the decisional law of the case, and formal rules of evidence
are employed, adversariness likewise increases. And, finally, where one party can
compel the other to participate in the process, true only with respect to traditional
court litigation among the processes chosen here for evaluation, it is reasonable

15. Edwards, Hopes and Fearsfor Alternative DisputeResolution, 21 WiLLAMETE L. REV. 425,

428 (1985).
16. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LIJ. 1073, 1085 (1984).
17. This point has not gone unobserved. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. MODEL COnE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
19. Burger, Midyear Meeting, Am. Bar Ass'n., 52 U.S.LW. 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984).
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to assume that the adversarial nature of the process increases. Given all this, it
is not surprising that traditional litigation is the most adversarial of our processes
and negotiation the least.
Degree of Communication Fostered Among the Disputants: It has been
suggested that the greater the degree of direct communication among the
disputants (not their attorneys), the fewer future problems will arise between these
disputants. It may also be hypothesized that there is an inverse relationship
between the degree of communication and the degree of adversariness in the
process. After evaluating the factors likely to result in a higher degree of
communication (primarily those factors over which the parties have some control
in some of the processes, the roles played by both attorneys and involved third
parties, and the method of presentation used), this latter hypothesis is proved true
for the ends of the two continuums, but less of a predictor in the middle of them.
Degree to Which Party Power Imbalances are Neutralized During the
Process: A variety of factors enters into this analysis. For example, one can
assume that the stronger the role played by a third party, the less likely party
power imbalances will affect the outcome. Where decisional information other
than that supplied by the parties is usable, the power imbalances should be less
significant. Similarly, where discovery can be compelled, the rule of law (which
is theoretically neutral) is primary, and the decision is both reviewable and
enforceable by the government, one would expect that power imbalances would
be less significant. Not included in the analysis is the existence of formal rules
of evidence and procedure (which can be used as swords, as well as shields) or
the role played by attorneys, although there is some evidence that whether both
disputants have attorneys is significant.2" Considering only these factors, courts
and neutral fact-finding neutralize power imbalances most and negotiation does so
least.
This evaluation is quite limited and is far from the last word on party power
imbalances. For example, much has been said regarding courts as a tool of the
elite and powerful and the impact that economic strength has on litigation
outcomes. 2' Further, one might argue that whatever power imbalances exist, they
will continue to exist after the process ends and the parties are once again on their
own. Contra to this is the argument that if you give the disputants the tools to
resolve their own disputes, and an experience of so doing, pre-existing power
imbalances may be reduced even after the completion of this process. 22 Finally,
to the extent that the weaker party is also the legally damaged party,23threat of
future court suit may decrease the impact of other power imbalances.

20. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69
JUDICATURE 270, 275 (1986).
21. Cf. Nelson, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Supermartfor Law Reform, 14 N.M.L. REV.
467, 472 (1984).
22. Faulkes, Pursuing the Best Ends by the Best Means, 59 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 457, 462 (1985).
23. Cf Bacigal, An EmpiricalCase Study ofInformal Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 0HIO ST.
J. ON Disp. REsOL 1 (1988); Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice ofDispute
Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245, 285 (1984).
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Whether the Process is Primarily Interest-Based or Rights-Based: This
category is somewhat different than the others. Some of the literature has
discussed various processes as being either based on interest arguments or on
arguments of right.24 The factors that are considered in making this determination here are: the predominant method of presentation, the decisional law of the
case, the role of attorneys in the process, the role of the third party as decisionmaker or otherwise and whether the output is an assessment of rights or the result
of a consensus. It should be pointed out that this dichotomy does not seem
particularly useful when applied to neutral fact-finding, the sine qua non of which
is an independent investigation of "truth" by an expert in the relevant field.
Degree that Voluntary Obedience to the Process Output can be Expected:
Voluntary obedience to the process output is significant when evaluating the
efficiency of the system, finality and the reduction of total societal disputes. It
may also indicate something about the perceived justice of the process. In general,
one can probably expect a higher degree of voluntary compliance either where the
decision is a result of a highly participatory process (this is largely the theory
behind negotiated rulemaking and negotiated legislation) or where there is a
substantial enforcement mechanism waiting in the wings. Thus, empirical research
may not evidence much difference in compliance statistics following a traditional
court process and following a highly participatory process like negotiation.
Because a high compliance can be gained in either of two ways, three-fifths of the
procedures reviewed are indicated as likely to result in a high degree of voluntary
obedience. It should be noted that arbitration and med-arb scored relatively high
under both sets of criteria.
Degree of Review Available: This category is not applicable to those
procedures for which no review is available. For the other processes, the factors
considered are the number of reviews available, the identity of the reviewing body
and the standards applied on review. Legislation, both traditional and negotiated,
ranked highest on this scale, while arbitration and med-arb ranked lowest (of those
procedures for which any review was available).
Degree of Government Involvement: The assessment of this quality can
almost be read directly from Table I under government involvement, but also
considered here is the government's involvement in choosing the involved third
party. Nevertheless, there are no surprises in this category.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF DiSPUTE VARIABLES: TABLE 3
This section considers two areas: the types of claims involved in the dispute
and the characteristics of and relationships among the parties. In other words, this
section focuses on the "extra-legal" aspects of disputes. 2
Whereas system

24. Cf. Perritt, supra note 8, at 866.
25. Dauer, Litigation v. Alternative Dispute Resolution-Let's Talk About It, 17 CoLO. LAw. 655,

657 (1988).
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characteristics formed the first, these considerations form the second element for
consideration in "letting the forum fit the fuss."
Again, the variables selected for inclusion are based on the comments and
observations of various writers. They differ significantly from the material in Part
II, however, in that these variables have not been identified by theory or analysis
so much as by the observations of practitioners. The material contained in Table
3 is in the nature of "rules of thumb" or recommendations. The information is for
guidance and testing, not for reliance. They are not hard and fast rules. The
reader will notice immediately that there are many holes in the table that have yet
to be filled in. Some may never be, having been included for consideration in
individual cases instead of for development of a related rule. It was viewed as
more important to catalog the diversity of possible variables than to reach
conclusions about each included variable with regard to each of the selected
dispute resolution systems.
Any attempt to use the information contained in the table to assess a
particular dispute will immediately result in conflicting signals. It will be the rare
dispute that will exhibit all the variables found beneficial for the use of any
particular dispute mechanism. It is to be expected that the analysis of a particular
controversy will frequently indicate several "better" resolution mechanisms, many
"bad" mechanisms to use and no clear "winner." This supports the suggestion that
"in virtually no area of life is such a one-to-one mapping of disputes onto forums
26

found.1

Much of the table is self-explanatory and will be left that way. The
remainder of this section will highlight some of the issues and considerations that
are perhaps not so self-explanatory.
The degree of complexity in the resolution of a particular dispute is in large
part a function of the alignment of the parties and the multitude and interconnection of the issues comprising the dispute. For example, parties can be aligned one
against one, one against many where the relationship between the one (e.g., the
plaintiff) and each of the many (e.g., the defendants) is essentially the same, many
against many where again the relationship between each plaintiff and each
defendant is essentially the same (e.g., a class action suit against manufacturers of
a specific drug), or many against many where, although the issues are all related,
there are more than two sides and the relationships among the parties are very
diverse. Recall that the working definition of "dispute" for this Article is a
collection of issues which need or would benefit from simultaneous solution. An
example of a dispute falling into the last category is the controversy that arose
from the abandonment of two nuclear power plants under construction which were
owned primarily by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS).
When the plants were abandoned there were disputes (1) between various
contractors and WPPSS, (2) between WPPSS and its bondholders, (3) between
WPPSS and the other owners (for-profit private power companies), (4) between
WPPSS and its member public power companies and (5) between ratepayers in at

26. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 914 (1979).
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least six different states and all of the involved power companies. Although in an
ideal world all of these disputes would have been resolved in one forum by
simultaneous solution, our court system would choke on such an endeavor.
Instead there were multiple contractor suits, multiple bondholder suits, suits before
state regulatory agencies in at least six states and suits and negotiations among the
various owners. The term "polycentric" is used here to describe such multi-party,
multi-sided disputes.
Even where a dispute is not polycentric, but still involves many parties, in
an ideal world different issues making up the dispute may need to be treated
differently from a procedural point of view. For example, common liability
questions may be best resolved together, while remedy issues may be best treated
on a party-by-party basis. 27 Such a separation of different issues for different
procedures may also be beneficial where there are only two parties, such as
splitting the treatment of custody and visitation issues from property settlement
issues in a divorce. 28
This discussion brings up a related issue-the debate in the literature
regarding the best forum for redressing social ills. Many observers have remarked
that this is not an appropriate use of our courts. Yet there are numerous
statements to the effect that political, controversial, policy and fundamental value
issues should not be resolved through any of the alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. My own assumption is that the latter speakers did not have in mind
the alternatives of negotiated legislation and negotiated rulemaking at the time they
made such statements. Such alternatives seem particularly well suited to the
resolution 29of such issues, an opinion which has also seen light in current
literature.
The characteristics of the disputants listed toward the top of the table need
to be assessed separately for each of the involved parties. A monolithic disputant
is one who has "no significant internal differences among [its] constituent
members."30 It can readily be seen that many institutional disputants, such as
environmental groups and labor unions, will not be monolithic. This complicates
processes that call for consensus, but if such processes are nevertheless used the
diverse needs of the constituents may be more likely met through the possibility

27.
Bacigal,
28.
(1988).
29.

This is illustrated by the anecdotal report of the Westinghouse uranium case in the 1970s.
supra note 23, at 23-24.
Bianchi, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Is the Jury Still Out?, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 174, 175

The following is apropos:
Other commentators have explained that many fundamental values are particularly
susceptible to resolution through consensual process: "[The problems around which
many (and perhaps the most important) social conflicts turn have no 'right' or 'wrong'
answer in any moral or even technical sense. Such conflicts are best resolved through a
mechanism based not upon principle but upon pragmatic accommodation and adjustment."
Comment, An Alternative to the TraditionalRulemaking Process: A Case Study of Negotiation in the
Development of Regulations, 29 Viu.- L REv. 1505, 1517 n.47 (1983-84) (authored by Robert L.
Sachs, Jr.) (quoting Schuck, Litigation,Bargaining,and Regulation, 3 REG., July-Aug. 1979, at 26,31).
30. Dunlop, supra note 7, at 1427.
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of creative resolution packages. Institutions also tend to be "repeat players" in
dispute resolution processes, with a variety of attendant advantages adhering to
them. These advantages may be present in non-litigation modes of dispute
resolution, as well as in traditional litigation settings. It is an open issue whether
such a power disparity (as well as others) is or can be neutralized simply by
preserving or improving access to courts
where some other alternative is used as
31
the primary resolution mechanism.
The disputant characteristic "emotional" is intended to raise the issue of
whether there is a significant emotional component in the dispute. The more
consensual, interest-based resolution mechanisms are proffered as more likely to
truly resolve the fundamental issues of such disputes. On the other hand, the entry
"Sensible/irrational" is meant to identify situations where one or more parties are
intractable, leaving little hope for a consensual resolution.
All attorneys are not created equal, either in competence or in resources
available to "zealously represent" their clients. This is a factor that should be
taken into consideration, as well as, according to some observers, 32 whether
opposing counsel is opposed to the use of alternatives to traditional court litigation.
Finally, whether attorneys as advocates or representatives (as opposed to advisors)
should be used at all should be considered. Certainly, if one party is so
represented, the others may be disadvantaged by not being similarly represented.
However, representation may be more of a hindrance than a help in some
processes due to the attorneys' inability to explain feelings of their principals or
respond fully to non-monetary requests.33
A final comment should be made with regard to the last two entries on Table
3. Both are properly classified as derivative characteristics. In any given case,
the evaluator should look at a number of other listed factors before determining
where the dispute or a disputant falls.
IV. PROCESS GOALS: TABLE 4
A. Introduction
There exists in the literature numerous and very elegant and persuasive
descriptions of the horrors of litigation, of the apocalypse that calls itself ADR,
of the wonders brought by the rule of law and our traditional court system, and
of the idyllic perfection of the alternatives. The examples cited are, of course, the
best and the worst of each. The thesis of this section departs from these
traditions. It has been aptly stated by Professor Cover: each institution "provides
a distinctive response to problems that other institutions with their different mix

31. Green, supra note 1, at 281-85.
32. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and FederalCourts: A ComparativeAnalysis of the
Perceptionsof ParticipatingLawyers, 4 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RnsoL 213, 216, 219 (1989).
33. Faulkes, supra note 22, at 458.
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of functions might address quite differently."34 Thus, we need to analyze the
functions played or furthered by each of our models. Stated another way, much
of the literature that accepts the use of ADR at least under some circumstances has
been concerned primarily with the pairing of dispute variables with the system
characteristics of various dispute resolution mechanisms. That approach is
insufficient. The- recommendation here is that such pairing, choosing and
evaluating should be done only in light of the process goals enhanced, or indeed
discarded, by the particular process.
No one mechanism is the only means of achieving any particular goal.
Indeed, societal institutions totally separate from any dispute resolution mechanism
may advance (or impede) some of the identified goals. Further, every mechanism
advances multiple goals simultaneously. Some mechanisms advance certain goals
more than alternative mechanisms do; certain mechanisms are counterproductive
to certain goals. No one mechanism advances, let alone achieves, all process
goals. It is the obligation of every society to continually reevaluate the relative
importance of the various goals in light of changing circumstances and make any
advantageous changes in the institutions that further those goals.
B. Discussion
This section considers what process goals are furthered by which dispute
resolution mechanisms or, perhaps more accurately, whether the system
characteristics of individual dispute resolution processes make it more or less
probable these process goals will be furthered. The reader should keep in mind
throughout that the discussion is of goals and whether they are furthered, not
whether they are achieved.
A summary of the material discussed here appears on Table 4. It is not
complete, nor is it offered as "truth." It is offered for consideration, refinement
and argument. Further, where a particular dispute resolution mechanism is not
marked as furthering a particular goal, it does not follow that it does not further
it at all or that it may actually hinder the accomplishment of such a goal. Rather,
it indicates that other mechanisms are more likely to promote that particular
attribute.
Perhaps all would agree that all of our dispute resolution mechanisms do or
should have as goals both substantive justice and procedural fairness. (All would
certainly not agree as to the meaning of either substantive justice or procedural
fairness.) Perhaps we could further agree that the reduction of overall societal
disputes and of future disputes between particular disputants are also universal
process goals. Assuming such agreement, these goals are not themselves charted,
but rather their component parts are depicted on Table 4. These four goals
represent four of the five overall goals discussed in this part. (Substantive justice
has been further subdivided, for purposes of the table, into social justice and

34. Cover, supra note 26, at 912.
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individual justice.) The fifth major goal is truth. As will be discussed below,
truth may not be a goal in many of the systems under discussion.
The discussion which follows will be split into these five categories. It
should be pointed out that there are considerable overlaps and interrelationships
among these topics that cannot be fully explored through the organization chosen
for this section.
Substantive Justice: The discussion of justice is split into the two categories
previously noted, social justice and individual justice. Neither category will take
into account justice as perceived by the participants and disclosed in various
surveys. It does seem appropriate, however, to say a few words in that regard
given that it has been a significant component of what empirical research does
exist in the area of ADR. Most of the comments of perceived justice involve
subjective questions addressed to users of a particular system, without any attempt
or ability to assess other systems that might have been used instead. In general,
participants of various alternatives have given positive, if not exactly rave, reviews
of the systems used. 35 Nevertheless, the traditional court process is not without
its admirers.36
Much of the literature has addressed issues of justice in the context of
evaluating dispute resolution techniques. Oft repeated phrases include, ironically
enough, both "second-class justice" and "rich man's justice." Both refer to
alternatives to traditional court adjudication. Although these allegations and their
rebuttals are worth pursuing in their own right, they do not provide a good focus
for the purpose at hand. Instead, what this section attempts is to identify certain
characteristics that may further the overall goal of justice and determine which of
the highlighted dispute resolution mechanisms exhibit such characteristics.
With regard to social justice, the following factors are considered:
substantive consistency, a societal cost-benefit analysis, the enforcement and
fulfillment of societal norms, openness and progressiveness. The most difficult
criteria to address in this list is the cost-benefit analysis. Volumes could (and
probably will) be written on this subject alone. A complete analysis would
probably subsume every other category on Table 4, perhaps particularly the overall
reduction of the size and number of disputes in society. For example, any
respectable cost-benefit analysis would have to consider how the dispute resolution
mechanism is being used, i.e., for what type of disputes. The high cost of
litigation might well be justified on a societal basis for suits addressing civil rights
issues, but not for suits among family members over their respective shares of an
inheritance. The table does not attempt to make this type of judgment. It looks

35. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217, 222
(1989); Hatch, supra note 3, at 3; Green, supra note 1, at 268; Hensler, supra note 20, at 276.
36. Lambros, The Alternatives Movement: Rekindling America's Creative Spirit, 1 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. REsOL 3, 4 (1985) ("Today our system is challenged by the unprecedented volume of
litigation. This increase in filings should be viewed as a challenge rather than as a problem. People
are now bringing their disputes into the open, seeking expert assistance with resolution. This positive
development reflects a public trust in America's legal system and a public confidence that the system
can consistently resolve controversies in a fair, equitable, and efficient manner.").
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instead only at factors that are characteristic of the various dispute resolution
mechanisms, regardless of the type of dispute submitted for resolution. Further,
factors listed elsewhere on the table are not duplicated here. Thus, the two
considerations addressed here, predictability and the reduction of meritless
grievances, are at best only the tip of the iceberg.
Predictability is the characteristic that gives guidance to present and future
disputants. Some of the alternatives undertaken under court auspices have as a
rationale permitting the litigants to get a better idea what result would pertain
following a full trial. Predictability increases where the results are comprehensible. Substantive consistency also plays a role, but the information contained under
that heading is not duplicated here. The risks and uncertainties associated with
winner-take-all results decrease predictability. Other factors that may affect
predictability include the use of a proof-based presentation, the use of a third-party
specialist and the formality of the proceeding. However, to the extent that the
ultimate outcome is based on technical rules instead of the merits, predictability
is decreased. For this reason, traditional litigation does not score well. (It is
assumed, although not proved, that alternatives under a court's auspices are more
likely to result in a decision on the merits.)
Such factors as those which follow were considered in the analysis of
whether a particular dispute resolution mechanism is likely to reduce the number
of meritless grievances: limits on the forum's jurisdiction, presentation by way
of proofs, the availability of discovery, use of specialists, the existence of a thirdparty decisionmaker, the existence of a public record and the availability of a
substantive review.
Quite a number of the mechanisms further substantive consistency if one
considers such consistency as upheld by such characteristics as use of the rule of
law, assessment of rights, the setting of precedent and the degree of available
review based on the review standards used.
The enforcement and fulfillment of societal norms--our political, cultural and
social values-is often cited as a benefit of our court system. Indeed, some seem
almost to mourn the loss of litigation as morality plays in the wake of more
widespread use of ADR. However, a substantial proportion of litigation cases
have no real moral component. The question is often closer to who is going to
bear an unexpected loss. After considering the use of an unrestricted source of
decisional information, an accountable third party, and a third party as a
decisionmaker, as well as the existence of a substantive review of the result, courts
did indeed rank well, although not quite as well as either form of legislation and
only equally with either form of rulemaking.
The openness of the system tends to give us confidence that social justice is
being met, as well as itself helping to insure that that is true. There is a question
of the propriety of state enforcement of results that are not based on open or
public processes. Essentially this category is a summation of the system
characteristic of confidentiality. Whether a dispute resolution can be considered
progressive depends largely on to what degree it can adjust to changing
circumstances. Resolution mechanisms that permit creative solutions and are not
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss2/1
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hidebound by elaborate rules and those that seek input from a wide variety of
sources are probably best. Courts fare poorly under this criteria.
Overall, negotiated rulemaking seems to further the goal of social justice
more than any of the other mechanisms and none of the alternatives reviewed are
completely deficient in this respect.
The next aspect of substantive justice is individual justice, that is, how well
each system addresses the actual situation of the parties before it. Again, this
category has been decomposed into a number of components: creativity (the
parallel to substantive consistency in the social justice analysis), establishment and
protection of individual rights, a cost-benefit analysis from the disputants'
perspective, maximizing joint gains and humaneness.
'The characteristic of creativity has been much remarked upon in the
literature. For example,
it is not the sole purpose of ADR to achieve faster and cheaper
resolutions of disputes. In addition to all of these good things, the
purpose of ADR is also to achieve "better" resolutions of disputes-or
at least to generate a wider range of possible solutions (not just
decisions) for any given problem. 7
The point here is a system's ability to respond to the unique needs and situations
of the individuals actually before it. Equal treatment does not necessarily result
in the greatest justice to the individual because no two disputants are ever
precisely similarly situated. Thus, the rule of law, while a good indication of
social justice, is only a second-best solution from an individual disputant's
standpoint. We have rules that attempt to provide justice in the greatest number
of cases, but the development of equity testifies to tension between the establishment of rules and individual justice. (At this point, most of our equity principles
have also been reduced to "rules" of general application.) This room for creative
solution can also be viewed from another perspective, that is, the ability to
maximize joint gains. Through the use of creative (and non-monetary) solutions,
one side may benefit substantially more than the other side is hurt as a result of
the form reparations take.3s (A good example is where a defendant supplier
"1pays" a judgment with goods, where the payment is assessed "at cost" on the
defendant's books, but the plaintiff purchaser "receives" value based on the market
price of the goods.) As can be seen from the table, creativity is very closely
related to the progressiveness goal under social justice.
Individual justice is also closely connected to the establishment and protection
of individual rights. Systems that are based on an assessment of rights, that
develop principles of individual rights, that provide a substantive review for
violations of those rights and that use autonomous decisionmakers are more likely
to protect individual rights. Courts are the clear winners in this category.

37. Dauer, supra note 25, at 656 (emphasis in original).
38. For specific examples, see Bacigal, supra note 23, at 24 n.102.
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Individual disputant cost-benefit analyses ate almost as problematical as
societal cost-benefit analyses. On the table, the cost-benefit analysis is represented
by two categories, timeliness and low cost. Again, these factors only scratch the
surface of what is undoubtedly relevant to a well done analysis. And again,
factors that appear elsewhere on the table, such as the reduction of future disputes
between these same parties, are not included here. Because the most often
repeated rationale for ADR mechanisms is their efficiency in terms of cost and
time, these factors have received more consideration (including more empirical
study) than any others on the table. The empirical research to date is conflicting
and the interpretation of the results is hotly debated, but some of the anecdotes of
"success" in this area make delightful reading.3 9 Nevertheless, some judgments
have been made based on the information available.40
Anyone that has watched a ciose friend or acquaintance get dragged into a
lawsuit knows that court litigation can bring with it a tremendous level of
emotional pain and trauma. The humaneness of the process used therefore is a
significant component of individual justice. It is related to the degree of
informality of the system, its cooperative as opposed to adversarial nature, and the
degree of communication fostered between the parties. Not surprisingly, the noncourt alternatives come off well in this category.
Again, in the area of individual justice, none of the dispute resolution
mechanisms is totally deficient, but courts clearly do not fair well against the more
disputant-controlied forms of dispute resolution.
ProceduralFairness: This category has been broken into three component
parts: procedural protections, participatory governance and accessibility to the
court system. The first category, procedural protection, in turn is broken down
into (1) having a hearing at which (2) an impartial third party presides.
Noticeably absent is procedural protection through the provision of evidentiary and
procedural rules. Such a consideration was deliberately omitted because of the

39. My personal favorite is a story told by one of TRW's then-attomeys of the patent infringement
action brought against TRW by Telecredit. He relates, "[Tlhings had gotten so bad that there was a
major disagreement about whether coffee would be provided to the other side while they inspected
documents at one side's plant." Solution was ultimately reached by the use of a mini-trial. "This six
million dollar lawsuit that had consumed a half a million dollars in legal fees over three years was
settled within thirty minutes after these two days of presentations to the great satisfaction of both
sides." Recent Developments in ADR, supra note 1, at 514-16 (description related by Eric D. Green,
later a professor of law at Boston University).
40. Cf Alfini, supra note 32, at 222, 229-30, 232; Broderick, supra note 35, at 219, 222; Bacigal,
supra note 23, at 3; Bianchi, supra note 28, at 175; Hatch, supra note 3, at 2; Bedikian, Overview of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 1986 MICH. B.J. 876; Green, supra note 1, at 246, 267,
270; Daynard, Redress by a Licensing Authority: Settling Home Improvement Disputes in New York
City, 1985 J.DiSP. RESOL 89, 109-11; Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal
DistrictCourts, 37 U. FLA. L REv. 29, 32, 34 n.32 (1985); Cook, A Quest for Justice: Effective and
Efficient Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes,4 DEr. C.L. REv. 1129, 1132, 1134, 1136 (1983);
McKay, Developments in "Alternative"DisputeResolution: An Overview, 115 F.R.D. 361, 364 (1986);
Judicial Conference, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 111 F.R.D. 193, 198-99, 203 (1985); Recent
Developments in ADR, supra note 1, at 521.
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controversy over whether such rules as they are manifest in the present system
provide for procedural fairness or rather allow those who would lose on the merits
to escape because of technicalities. "[G]iven a fair hearing and an impartial
decisionmaker, they preferred a timely, informal process to more formal
proceedings that entailed both high cost and delay."4 Or again, "most individual
litigants have a simple definition of what constitutes a fair dispute resolution
process: they want an42opportunity to have their cases heard and decided by an
impartial third party."
Another aspect of this evaluation is also likely to elicit some objection: that
is the definition of having a hearing. As used here it refers to whether the
disputant has an opportunity to tell his or her side of the story, not whether he or
she "had their day in court." 43 According to one study:
[T]here are telling differences between those who entered mediation and
those who stayed in the court. In the Brooklyn study, 94% of the
victims who mediated felt they had an opportunity to tell their story;
only 65% of those who went through the judicial process had the same
reaction.... And the defendants' reactions? Proportionately over twice
as many of those who mediated as those who went to trial in court felt
they had an opportunity to express their side of events-90% to
40%. 44
Participatory governance is a democratic notion. It suggests that it is more
fair if those who are to be affected by a decision have more input into the process.
The factors that would indicate that here are: likelihood of notice, the source of
the decisional information, representative third parties, a disputant decisionmaker,
consensus as the basis of the decision reached and procedures with the least
potential for absent, but affected disputants.
Finally, accessibility to court is considered. It should be noted that the
existence of some of the alternatives to court may increase access to courts for
other disputants (or even for those for whom the alternative does not result in a
complete resolution of the dispute) if any significant reduction in judicial backlog
can be achieved by the existence of the alternatives. Along this line there has
been the suggestion that some courts are looking to alternatives "in an effort to
satisfy their constitutional mandate." 45 In alternatives under the auspices of a
court, the lurking judicial power may also be used to equalize negotiating power
between the parties, thereby resulting in a fairer settlement process than might

41. Levin & Golash, supra note 40, at 35.
42. Id. at 35 n.44 (quoting D. HENSLER, REFORMING THE CIVIL IATIGATnON PROCESS: How
COURT ARBITRATION MAY HELP 8-9 (1984)).
43. lzbiky & Savage, ADR: Explanations,Examples and Effective Use, 18 COLO. LAw. 843, 848
(1989); Harrington & Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 709, 726, 728 (1988); Faulkes, supra note 22, at 458.
44. Cooke, Mediation: A Boon or a Bust?, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 3, 22-23 (1983).
45. Cook, supra note 40, at 1131.
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occur away from a court.' On the other hand, some of these same programs
to court. 47
have been criticized for their mandatory nature as reducing access
This criticism has less force as long as access to court is not precluded.
On the admittedly controversial scales used here, mediation is the heavyweight and courts appear lightweight by comparison.
Truth: This category may exhibit the greatest dissonance between goal and
reality. In theory truth should be a concern of rights disputes more than interests
disputes. Systems that are looking for truth should adopt proof, not persuasion,
as the method of presentation; they should have a neutral third-party decisionmaker; they should allow full discovery; and they should provide for substantive
review on the merits. This sounds like our court system. And yet there is
considerable controversy over whether the extreme adversariness in our courts
substantially defeats this goal of truth. 48 In that case, the system most likely to
actually result in truth is our neutral fact-finder. In keeping with the rest of the
table, however, what will be recorded is the goal, not the reality.
Reduction of Overall Number and Size of SocietalDisputes: On one side, the
argument exists that every time we add another form of dispute resolution to our
package of usable mechanisms, the number or size of disputes system-wide should
reduce. The argument is that the more we increase accessibility to any forum, the
more disputes can be handled expeditiously before they grow into monster disputes
or before they become chronic problems. But this argument alone does not
distinguish among resolution mechanisms, i.e., the existence of any given
mechanism helps fulfill this goal. On the other side of this argument is the theory
that the more forums available, the more disputes will be brought; that demand
will expand to fit the supply. Again, this side of the argument does not
distinguish among resolution mechanisms. Considerations that may distinguish
among the processes are the extent that they (1) develop and articulate norms, (2)
promote the internalization of norms, (3) promote peacefulness within the society,
(4) promote individual empowerment for resolving one's own problems, (5)
engender obedience to the result reached and (6) create aggregate solutions. These
are the factors addressed in this section.
The systems that develop and articulate societal norms are those that promote
the reasoned elaboration of normative principles, i.e., the rule of law. While other

46. Cf Bacigal, supra note 23, at 25.
47. Edelman, InstitutionalizingDispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 134 (1984).
48. Patterson,Dispute Resolution in a World ofAlternatives, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 591,600 (1988).
The problem is eloquently stated in Nelson, supra note 21, at 470:
It is a mistake to assume that truth will emerge from two highly partisan arguments,
mutually exaggerating the strengths and understating the weaknesses of their respective
positions. Furthermore, our rules of professional conduct permit conduct that prima facie
impedes a search for the truth. For example, it is proper professional conduct to:
1. cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting testimony of a witness known to
be telling the truth;
2. exploit an opponent's evidence known to be false; and
3. fail to introduce or advise the opponent of material adverse evidence.
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systems may apply and support existing societal norms, the only systems under
consideration that develop and articulate such norms are the courts, the legislature
and administrative agencies. The output of these systems have precedential value.
Systems that promote the internalization of norms also reduce societal
disputes because they create citizens who are more apt to accept and act on
normative values. Such systems reduce anti-social behavior, encourage a higher
level of citizenship, "broaden the commitment of most to the rule of law, [and]
increase voluntary law abidingness."49 What systems have this ameliorative
effect? Those that are voluntary and participatory. While all of the systems
considered support this goal at some level, Table 4 indicates those that do it
particularly well.
The aspect of peacefulness considered here is the aspect that permits and
promotes the venting of the emotional side of a dispute, allowing the disputants
to get on with other things.
Individual empowerment focuses on the existence of widespread individual
dispute resolution competence. The notion is that early use of self-help forms of
dispute resolution will decrease not only the demand pressure on institutionalized
mechanisms, but the magnitude and number of societal disputes. More than one
article has speculated on the value of educating the general populace in self-help
forms of dispute resolution, perhaps through the public school system. 50
What will be the consequences of a public skilled in dealing
creatively with conflicts? Will universities and law schools be ready
when these students enter their classrooms? Will community violence,
particularly juvenile crime, decrease? Will suits cease to be the answer?
Will lawyers change their style or go out of style? Will the foundations
of our legal system be challenged? Will people who feel confident in
handling their personal and community disputes in a non-adversarial
manner demand that governments solve international disputes without
violence? We do not know the answers to these questions, but the
impact of teaching dispute resolution skills to children certainly will be
profound. 51
The more disputes are characterized as rights disputes, as opposed to interests
disputes, the more necessary a third-party decisionmaker becomes and, thus, the
less likely that self-help will be successful. As one writer stated, "Lawyers tend
to assume that a client's legal rights are more important than any other inter-

49. Id. at 481; Davis & Porter, Dispute Resolution: The Fourth "R', 1985 J. DisP. RESOL 121,
125-26.
50. Nelson, The Immediate Future ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 14 PEPPERDINE L REv. 777,
779 (1987); Davis & Porter, supra note 49, at 122; Cooke, Introduction, Symposium on Alternatives
to Litigation, 48 ALB. L REv. 569, 570 (1984).
51. Davis & Porter, supra note 49, at 122.
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est."52 It should be pointed out that many, if not most, disputes may be treated
either as rights or as interests disputes; there is nothing inherent in the substance
of most disputes that require they be treated one way or the other. Thus, to the
extent that we choose to characterize a particular dispute as a rights dispute, we
impede individual empowerment. Systems that require a dispute to be ripe or
mature before it will be addressed through that requirement support individual
empowerment by giving the disputants an opportunity to address the problem
without the use of the forum. Another important factor is the degree of system
informality. We cannot expect the lay public to master intricate procedural
arrangements, for example.
The goal of obedience to the process output has an obvious relationship to
the overall reduction of societal disputes. "[B]y actively involving the disputants
in shaping the agreement and binding them personally to make the agreement
work, the parties become psychologically bound to respect the terms of their
resolution."5 3 Thus, participatory systems are more likely to result in obedience,
as are those which employ the disputants themselves as decisionmakers.
Finally, it stands to reason that where the output of a system provides an
aggregate solution, reduction of societal disputes should follow. In our society the
only mechanisms designed to do this are those of legislation and administrative
rulemaking.
The aggregation of these factors indicates that the systems best designed to
reduce overall social conflict are negotiated legislation, negotiated rulemaking,
med-arb, mediation and negotiation. Notably, private judging, administrative
adjudication, arbitration and neutral fact-finding seem to have little impact on the
attainment of this goal.
Reduction of Future Disputes Among These Parties: There is a very close
relationship between this goal and some of the factors discussed previously.
Nevertheless it seems useful to state this as a separate goal in its own right. The
factors considered here are the degree of cooperativeness among the parties, the
degree of communication, finality and legitimacy. Cooperation is really the
reverse of adversariness and is thus easy to chart at this point. The degree of
communication among the disputants themselves also varies from system to
system. Some mechanisms require the presence of the principals, such as the
mini-trial. In contrast, attorneys representing their clients in a traditional court
battle frequently expressly instruct their clients not to talk to the other side.
Again, the more participatory processes foster communication among the
disputants.
"If people are able to participate in devising a solution to a problem they
face, they are not likely to bring suit later."54 Thus, consensus agreements and
disputant decisionmakers are likely to advance the goal of finality. On the other
side, however, the availability of enforcement and the degree of formality of the

52. Stulberg, supra note 3, at 737.
53. Cooke, supra note 44, at 12.
54. Fine, supra note 3, at 6.
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process may also advance the goal. As a practical matter, the perceived justice
and fairness of the solution should have a significant impact. According to one
study, disputants are two times more likely to comply with a mediated agreement
than with a court judgment."5 On this scale, the summary jury trial comes off
quite well.
Legitimacy is concerned with the need to justify the process outcome to one's
constituents. Litigation outcomes in our society are apparently considered
legitimate from this point of view.56 The suggestion has been raised, and might
have some validity, that any method of dispute resolution accepted and used by
lawyers will be viewed as legitimate." This, of course, does not particularly
advance our analysis here. Legitimacy is enhanced by processes that can be said
to invoke democratic principles by choosing third parties who are representative,
either of the populace or of the disputants, particularly where those third parties
are also the decisionmaker.
Under these criteria, the processes most likely to reduce future conflict
among these disputants are negotiated legislation, med-arb, mediation, the minitrial and negotiation. The only process which seems not particularly to further this
goal is traditional rulemaking.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this analysis is that it be used. Apart from its utility as a
classroom tool, this section attempts to suggest some other ways in which it may
prove useful.
As a beginning, it should suggest research topics, both theoretical and
empirical, in such areas as: how well process goals are actually met by the
various dispute resolution mechanisms and how the various mechanisms,
recognizing both their system characteristics and their process goals, can be most
compatibly matched to the characteristics of the disputants and the underlying
dispute in specific instances. Any work in this area should recognize that there
is unlikely to be just one appropriate forum for any given dispute. 8
This analysis may also help in the reevaluation of our "tried and true"
methods of dispute resolution-legislatures, courts and administrative agencies-from the broader perspective of dispute resolution generally, recognizing that
all of these mechanisms are interrelated and have common elements. For
example, the strengths and weaknesses of traditional court litigation can be
reevaluated in light of other available mechanisms and in light of our current
social milieu, both nationally and internationally. Also intriguing are fresh looks

55. Izbiky & Savage, supra note 43, at 844.
56. Dauer, supra note 25, at 656.
57. Murray, Lawyers and Alternative Dispute Resolution Success, 14 PEPPERDINE L REV. 781,
782 (1987).
58. "Perhaps the message ADR brings to lawyers is best captured by a Chinese proverb: 'There
are seventeen solutions to every problem.'" Izbiky & Savage, supra note 43, at 856.
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at the traditional wisdom surrounding our "fourth" branch of government,
administrative agencies, such as the standards for substantive delegation and the
required components for a due process hearing.
Disputants are not the only ones concerned with identifying appropriate
forums. Legislatures are more and more concerned with how to react to the
alternatives proposed and in creating, facilitating and authorizing new processes.
Courts may also be involved in similar endeavors to the extent that they create
alternatives by court rule. Courts will have to address as well the issues raised by
parties before them who are contending either that a particular alternative cannot
be used or that an agreement to use such an alternative should be enforceable. In
all of these activities the decisionmaker should be evaluating the offered process
in its entirety, expressly considering all of a particular system's characteristics and
goals, as well as the characteristics of the disputants and the underlying dispute.
Finally, everyone involved in dispute resolution should begin considering the
complete dispute resolution package that should be offered to our citizens.
Historically, the mix of processes has changed. The present increase in our use
of our court system has at times been attributed in part to the breakdown in
historical informal resolution mechanisms such as church and family. 9 This
breakdown itself has been attributed to the growing diversity of our population,
our mobility and the lack of many common values. And yet we grow more
dependent on our fellow man and more interdependent with the rest of the world.
In all this diversity, we nevertheless have to find ways to resolve the inevitable
conflicts, both at home and worldwide, peacefully. As was stated in a Department
of Justice publication in 1984, "[W]ith increasing awareness that 'we are all in this
world together,' traditional win-lose, adversarial processes may be personally and
socially less satisfactory than more participative, collaborative problem solving that
reconciles the interests of all involved parties."' 6

59. Cooke, supra note 44, at 3 n.1.
60. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute Resolution,
Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy 8 (Jan. 1984).
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